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ANTITRUST POLICY AND MONOPSONY
Roger D. Blairt &Jeffirey L. Harrison$
I
INTRODUCTION
The owners of major league baseball teams have colluded in
dealing with free agents,' the NCAA regulates both the number of
athletic scholarships and the amount of compensation that athletes
receive, 2 financial aid officers of the elite colleges and universities
meet to avoid a bidding war for the most desirable students,3 tuna
canneries in California allegedly fix purchase prices at artificially low
levels,4 and antique dealers have rigged bids in public auctions, di-
viding the spoils later.5 What do all of these parties have in com-
mon? They employ monopsony power: power on the buying side
of the market.6
The classical theory of monopsony envisions a market with only
one buyer that uses its power to reduce the quantity purchased,
t Huber Hurst Professor of Business and Legal Studies, University of Florida.
$ Professor of Law, University of Florida. The authors appreciate the financial
support of the College of Business Administration and the College of Law at the Univer-
sity of Florida. We are also indebted to Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Lanzillotti, Vir-
ginia Maurer, William Page, and Richard Romano for helpful suggestions on an earlier
draft. Full responsibilty for what follows, however, is ours.
1 Hal Lancaster, Baseball Owners Conspired to Shut Down Market for Free Agents, Arbitra-
tor Rules, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1987, at 10, col. 1. The major league baseball players
negotiated away their rights to sue under the antitrust laws and, therefore, had to submit
grievances based on alleged antitrust violations to arbitration. Some critics who fail to
respect the laws of supply and demand prefer collusion. See, e.g., George Vecsey, Bring
Back Collusion, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at D23, col. 1'.
2 Gary S. Becker, The NCAA: A Cartel In Sheepskin Clothing, Bus. WK., Sept. 14, 1987,
at 24.
3 David Johnston, Price-Fixing Inquiry at 20 Elite Colleges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1989,
at 1, col. 2. The Department ofJustice is also investigating these colleges and universi-
ties for the more traditional charge of price fixing on the selling side with regard to
tuition. See Connie Leslie & Sue Hutchison, An Ivy League Cartel, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21,
1989, at 65; Division Seeks Documents From Colleges In Probe of Financial Aid and Tuition, 57
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 278 (Aug. 31, 1989).
4 Eagle v. Star-Kist Foods, 812 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1987). The plaintiffs were fish-
ermen paid by vessel owners on a price per ton-of-fish-caught basis. Since the plaintiffs
were employees of the vessel owners, their injuries were derived from those suffered by
the vessel owners. On that basis, the Ninth Circuit held that they lacked standing.
5 United States v. Howe, Crim. No. 87-00262 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1987).
6 Monopsony exists when there is a single buyer of a good or service. GEORGE
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 216-18 (1987).
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thereby reducing the price that the monopsonist has to pay. 7 Since
monopsony results in reduced prices, a hostile antitrust policy to-
ward monopsony may appear inconsistent with our traditional anti-
trust goals.8 But further analysis shows that successful deployment
of monopsony power can cause inefficiencies and can hardly be re-
garded as competitive. 9
Once thought to be a rare market phenomenon,' 0 monopsony
has received scant attention in most antitrust casebooks" and
texts. 12 This lack of emphasis, however, ignores the symmetry of
markets: for every seller there is a buyer. Just as sellers may have
market power, so too may buyers. Further, to the extent that
casebooks and texts include monopsony cases, they fail to distin-
guish power on the buying side of the market from the more tradi-
tional concern with power on the selling side. In the context of
modem antitrust policy,'5 this lack of rigor is unfortunate. The cur-
rent trend is toward substantive analysis 14 and away from the
"bright line" tests prevalent in the earlier years of antitrust. This
trend requires judges and scholars to fully appreciate economic con-
sequences in order to avoid mistakes. 15 Analytical rigor is especially
7 Id; see infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text (precise details regarding exer-
cise of monopsony power).
8 The traditional economic goal of antitrust policy is "to promote consumer wel-
fare through the efficient use and allocation of resources, the development of new and
improved products, and the introduction of new production, distribution, and organiza-
tional techniques for putting economic resources to beneficial use." Donald F. Turner,
The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 798
(1987).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 32-52.
10 See, e.g., 4 PHiLiuP AREEDA & DoNALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 964b (1980).
11 A notable exception is RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST
146-50 (1981). Their casebook does not, however, deal with monopsony in any context
other than price-fixing.
12 Two texts touch on monopsony but fail to provide a comprehensive analysis of
the law or the economics. ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOM-
ics 178, 309-11 (1985); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw
17-18 (1985).
13 The increasing reliance upon economic analysis has been noted by many. See,
e.g., Turner, supra note 8 and Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts, 50
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 181, 181 (1987) ("In the past decade, a new picture of the
antitrust landscape has begun to emerge. The dominant emphasis of the ever more pop-
ular view concerns the ascendance of economics in antitrust decisionmaking and doc-
trine, particularly in Supreme Court adjudication, which is leading the way for the lower
courts.").
14 For a recent survey, see June 13 Remarks of Dr. Betty Bock at University College of
London, 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 109 (July 21, 1988) ("This emerging
mode ofjudicial analysis ... focuses ... on the reasons for the conduct and on how it
can be expected to affect the competitive process-and, in the end, the consumer.").
15 We examine the consequences of the move toward substantive analysis only in
the monopsony setting. A more general treatment is provided by William H. Page, The
Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiay
Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989) (description of how economic theory influences
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critical in the context of monopsony power because a monopsonist
usually employs its power to reduce the price it pays. If a court uses
the initial impact on price as the test for prohibited conduct, it may
conclude that monopsonistic behavior should be excused when, in
fact, just the opposite is true. 16 A court may reach such an errone-
ous conclusion for one of two reasons. First, as a purely substantive
matter, judges may view lower prices as an indication that a practice
is not harmful. 17 Second, as a procedural matter, plaintiff-sellers
generally have been forced to sell their outputs at lower prices and,
therefore, may be seen as not having suffered antitrust injury.'8
A recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, Balmoral Cinema v. Allied Artists Pictures,'9 illustrates the im-
portance of careful economic analysis to monopsony settings. In
Balmoral, the exhibitors agreed not to engage in competitive bidding
for films offered by distributors. 20 Standard bright-line antitrust
analysis might have resulted in the practice being treated as a per se
unlawful horizontal agreement to fix price, to engage in a group
boycott, or to allocate customers. Instead, the court noted that the
practice of the colluding buyers "may simply lower prices paid by
exhibitors to distributors. ' 2 1 The court also opined that the collu-
sion "may lower prices to moviegoers at the box office and may
serve rather than undermine consumer welfare. ' ' 22 Although the
antitrust decisionmaking in a variety of contexts including the application of per se rules
and the definition of antitrust injury).
16 Admittedly, it is counter-intuitive that the removal of monopsony leads to higher
input prices and, in most cases, lower prices of the monopsonist's output. This result is
not a special case, however;, rather, it is the general result. See infra notes 35-52 and
accompanying text.
17 The logic of excusing lower prices is obvious: if prices of intermediate goods or
raw materials are lower, production costs will be lower, and prices of final goods are apt
to be lower, ultimtely benefiting the consumer. Despite its apparent obviousness, the
argument is not correct. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
18 Antitrust injury is "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). For analytical treatments of anti-
trust injury, see Roger D. Blair &Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1539 (1989); William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Ap-
proach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 467 (1980). For an examination of antitrust
injury in the monopsony setting, see infra notes 194-221 and accompanying text.
19 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989).
20 The defendant-exhibitors were involved in a "split" arrangement under which
they would not compete against each other for first-run films but would allocate films
among themselves. The case was brought by a competing exhibitor who was unable to
obtain first-run films. Id. at 314-15.
21 Id. at 316.
22 Id. at 317. This is the same sort of mistake made by earlier courts confronting
movie theatre splits. See, e.g., Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 437
F. Supp. 1268 (D. Neb. 1977), aff'd as modified, 585 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978). Subsequent
courts have reached what we consider to be the correct answer. See, e.g., General Cin-
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opinion is, on balance, a thoughtful one, it comes dangerously close
to equating lower prices with overall economic benefit. In the case
of monopsony, the presence of lower prices should not end the
analysis because there is no correlation between an initial decrease
in prices and any overall long-run benefits to consumers.2 3
Our principal objective is to integrate the theory of monopsony
into the new substantive-based approach to antitrust analysis. We
begin by describing the standard theory of monopsony and its eco-
nomic harms. 24 Next, we pinpoint the similarities between monop-
sony and monopoly power before offering a brief overview of
antitrust treatment of monopsony.
In the succeeding sections, we examine judicial treatment of
monopsony power in the contexts of single-firm and collusive
abuses of power, 25 mergers,26 and price discrimination.2 7 We
demonstrate that when the courts have followed the bright-line for-
mulas of the past,28 they have generally treated monopsony in a
manner that is consistent with traditional antitrust policy. In effect,
blind adherence to formalistic rules has yielded correct substantive
results. This consistency is threatened, however, by the increasing
proclivity of courts toward substantive economic analysis of antitrust
cases. 29 We then seek to put existing policy on firmer footing by
proposing economically based justifications for those outcomes.30
ema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd on other
grounds, 681 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1982).
23 See infra text accompanying notes 32-72.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 74-139 (explaining why we think that the clas-
sic model understates the complexity of monopsony behavior).
25 See infra text accompanying notes 75-139.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 140-80.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 181-93.
28 For example, Justice Douglas's admonition in United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223, reh'g denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940) that "[u]nder the Sherman
Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of... depressing.., the
price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se" remains sound
advice under our analysis.
29 The reasoning in Balmoral Cinema v. Allied Artists Pictures, 885 F.2d 313 (6th
Cir. 1989) exemplifies our concern. Although it is appropriate to look at impact upon
the consumer, a court can be misled if it fails to understand and correctly apply relevant
economic principles.
30 Employing the right reasoning may be as important as reaching the right result.
Blind adherence to bright-line rules does not always provide correct results. For exam-
ple, Socony dictates that: "[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the pur-
pose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of
a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." Socony, 310 U.S. at 223.
Unthinking devotion to this rule led to the unjustifiable per se prohibition of maximum
resale price fixing. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (fixing maximum prices is a
violation of the Sherman Act), reh"g denied, 390 U.S. 1018 (1968); see also Roger D. Blair &
James M. Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing and The Goals of Antitrust, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 43,
77 (1986) ("the Court's prohibition of maximum price fixing must bejudged unambigu-
ously negative and judicial policy in this area should be re-examined"); Roger D. Blair &
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In so doing, we note the instances in which the courts probably have
not considered the monopsony issue with sufficient depth and care.
We also explain why the standard theoretical model often falls short
as an accurate description of monopsony conduct. Finally, we ana-
lyze monopsony in the context of emerging standards for antitrust
injury and antitrust standing.3 1
II
CLASSICAL MONOPSONY
A. Economic Standards
Pure monopsony entails a single buyer. It is the demand-side
analog of the monopolist who is a single seller. Just as the monopo-
list has market power 32 in selling its wares, the monopsonist has
buying power in purchasing its requirements. 33 Further, the econo-
mist objects to the exercise of monopsony power for the same rea-
son she objects to the exercise of monopoly power-both cause
social welfare losses.34
1. The Monopsonist's Input Price and Quantity
Figure 1 illustrates the welfare losses resulting from monop-
sony. It depicts supply35 and demand for an intermediate 36 good.
In this model, we assume that the sellers have no market power. If
the monopsonist ignored the effect that its purchases actually have
on the good's price, i.e., if it behaved as if it represented a perfectly
competitive buying side of the market, then it would buy the quan-
tity where demand and supply intersect, which is shown as Q, in the
figure. The price that corresponds to this quantity is shown as P1.
This price-quantity combination maximizes social welfare, which is
the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus.37 Consumer
David L. Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule and Consumer Welfare: An Economic Analysis, 33 U.
FLA. L. REV. 461 (1981) (criticizing prohibition of maximum resale price fixing).
31 See infra text accompanying notes 194-221.
32 For a carefl examination of what the term "market power" means in antitrust
parlance, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande & Steven C. Salop, Monopoly
Power and Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 76 GEO. LJ. 241 (1987); William M. Landes &
Richard M. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937 (1981).
33 E.T. SULLIVAN & JEFFREY HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS Eco-
NOMIC IMPLICATIONS 242-43 (1988).
34 See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 11, at 148-50.
35 In Figure 1, supply is upward-sloping. If the suppliers experience diminishing
returns to scale, their costs will increase as output expands. As a result, the firm will
expand output only in response to increased prices.
36 For expositional convenience and because most cases involve intermediate
goods, we have developed our model for an intermediate good. The analysis, however,
is perfectly generalizable and applies whenever competitive sellers deal with a single
buyer. See WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 516-19 (3d ed. 1985).
37 Consumer surplus represents the difference between what consumers are willing
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surplus is the area under the demand curve and above P1. Producer
surplus is the area above the supply curve and below P1. Absent
monopsony power, the forces of supply and demand will lead to a
maximization of social welfare.3 8
FIGURE 1
PRICE
MFC
SUPPLY
DEMAND
QUANTITY02 Q
The monopsonist will not behave like a group of buyers in com-
petition because such behavior conflicts with its desire to maximize
its profit. Because the monopsonist can influence the market price
of the intermediate good, the monopsonist will consider this power
to pay for a good and what they have to pay in the market. Producer surplus analo-
gously represents the difference between the price that producers are willing to accept
and what they receive in the market. See HAL VARAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS
258-60, 262-63 (1987).
38 Social welfare is the intellectual foundation for the economist's preference for
competition over other market structures. Once the total pie is maximized, distribu-
tional considerations can be resolved (in principle, at least) through transfer mecha-
nisms such as taxes and subsidies. See J.P. GOULD & C.E. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 444 (5th ed. 1980) (benefits of competition). On distributional issues, see
ANTHONY B. ATKINSON &JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC EcoNoMics 259-92
(1980).
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when making its decisions on the quantities of inputs to employ. As
a result, it will buy where the increase in total cost resulting from the
purchase of one additional unit of the input-marginal factor cost
(MFC)-intersects with demand.3 9 Consequently, it will purchase
quantity Q2. Instead of paying a price of P1 for the intermediate
good, it will pay P2, which is the lowest price at which the sellers will
provide quantity Q2.
The social welfare effects of monopsony are analogous to those
of monopoly-too few resources will be employed in the production
of the intermediate good.40 At the point where supply intersects
with demand, the value of the intermediate good, as measured by
the demand price, equals the cost to society of providing that quan-
tity as measured by the supply price. At this point, the employment
level is optimal in a social sense because all of the gains from trade
have been realized, and total welfare is maximized. But the monop-
sonist will not hire this number of units because it is not privately
optimal to do so. Private profit maximization will lead the monop-
sonist to employ the smaller quantity Q2. As a result, too few re-
sources will be employed-the value of the intermediate good,
given by the height of the demand curve, exceeds the social cost,
measured by the height of the supply curve.41 This means that the
monopsonist will forgo potential gains from trade opportunities. In
other words, the monopsonist's restricted hiring decision dimin-
ishes social welfare. The welfare loss is the striped triangular area in
Figure 1.
2. The Impact of Monopsony on Output Prices
Since the monopsonist extracts a lower price from its suppliers,
it is tempting to infer that the monopsonist's costs will drop and
consumers will benefit through lower prices on the monopsonist's
39 The marginal factor cost (MFC) curve takes into account the increase in price
that must be paid when the supply curve is positively sloped and purchases expand. See
R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 12, at 35-37; ROGER D. BLAIR & LAWRENCE W.
KENNY, MICROECONOMICS wrrH BUSINESS APPLICATIONS 375-78 (1987).
40 The antitrust laws do not appear to forbid what one may term "natural" monop-
sony, i.e., the existence of a single buyer due to circumstances beyond the buyer's con-
trol. This is appropriate since the buyer cannot do much about the fact that no one else
wants to buy the product in question and, therefore, there will be no practical remedy.
Collusive monopsony is another matter. See infra text accompanying notes 65-72.
41 This difference between the marginal value of an input to an employer and the
price paid for the input led Joan Robinson to complain about "monopsonistic exploita-
tion." Se JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECr COMPETITION 293-96 (1933).
Her complaint was that workers who were not paid a wage equal to their full value to the
employer were being exploited in the sense that the large employer could retain part of
the value contributed by the worker. SeeJ. GOULD & C. FERGUSON, supra note 38, at 400-
01.
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output. This is precisely the mistake that the Balmoral court made.42
The monopsonist does not pass on these lower costs because the
relevant costs for pricing decisions are marginal costs, and these are
not lower. This seems counter-intuitive, but comparing a monop-
sonist with a competitive buyer unclouds intuition. In both in-
stances, we assume initially that the firm is in a competitive final
goods market as a seller.
First, consider a monopsonist. A textile mill in an isolated town
in North Carolina may be a small player in the competitive textile
market but still have monopsony power in the local labor market. In
this case, the firm's optimal employment decision requires that P X
MPL = MFCL,43 where P denotes the price of the monopsonist's
output, MPL represents the marginal product of labor (the addition to
total output that results from employing an additional unit of labor),
and MFCL is the marginal factor cost of labor (the increase in total
expenditures on labor that results from employing an additional
unit of labor). In effect, the firm will hire an additional worker as
long as the market value of the incremental output that worker gen-
erates exceeds the incremental cost of hiring that worker. We also
know from standard economic theory that competitive firms pro-
duce at the point where output price equals the marginal cost of
production.44 We can see what this means in the current context by
rearranging the condition above. Dividing both sides of the equa-
tion by MPL, we have P = MFCL/MPL. This means that the firm's
marginal cost must be equal to the right-hand side of this second
equality. 45
We can compare this result with that of a textile mill that must
42 Recall that the Balmoral court thought monopsony power might result in lower
ticket prices to the moviegoers and thereby "serve rather than undermine consumer
welfare." Balmoral Cinema v. Allied Artists Pictures, 885 F.2d 313, 316 (6th Cir. 1985).
43 If this firm employs labor (L) and capital (K) in producing its final output (Q),
which it sells at a price of P, the firm's profit (H) function can be written as
11 = P X Q- wL - rk
where w and r denote the wage rate and the price of capital, respectively. A profit-
maximizing firm will hire labor to the point where any further increase in labor yields no
incremental profit:
11n oOQ
=- P - - (w + L(aw/8L)) = 0
Since lQ/aL is defined to be the marginal product of labor and (w+L(aw/aL)) is the
marginal factor cost of labor, we have the resulting expression in the text.
44 This is a well-known result. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 12, at 7-9; E.
SuL.rvAN &J. HARRISON, supra note 33, at 19-22.
45 This makes good sense: the numerator is the incremental input expenditure nec-
essary to expand employment and the denominator is the incremental output generated
by the expanded employment. The ratio is the incremental cost of output, which is the
definition of marginal cost. For a rigorous derivation, see C.E. FERGUSON, THE NEo-
CLASSICAL THEORY OF PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION 176-78 (1971).
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compete in both the output market and in the labor market. In this
case, the firm faces a constant wage rate regardless of the amount of
labor it employs. In effect, MFC is constant and equal to the wage.
Thus, the firm's optimal hiring decison requires that P X MPL =
w46 where w is the wage rate. Put differently, the firm will hire an
additional worker as long as the market value of the incremental
output that worker generates exceeds the wage rate. Again, rear-
ranging this equality by dividing both sides by MPL yields P =
w/MPL, which means that the marginal cost for this firm is w/MPL.
We have seen from Figure 1 that the MFC for a monopsonist
exceeds the competitive wage rate, i.e., MFCL is greater than w.
Consequently, the marginal cost for the monopsonist (MFCL/MPL)
is actually larger than the marginal cost for a firm with no monop-
sony power (w/MPL). Since marginal cost drives the firm's output
decision, the monopsonist will actually reduce its output below the
level that a seller without monopsony power would select. This
output reduction by one firm in a competitive market will have no
impact on the market price. The monopsonist will sell its output at
the market determined price. Thus, the decrease in the input price
to the monopsonist is not passed on to consumers. 47
, Suppose, however, that our textile mill produces a unique
product and, as a consequence, enjoys some market power 48 in the
sale of its output. This means that the monopsonist faces a nega-
tively sloped demand curve in its output market.49 Since the profit-
maximizing output is determined by the intersection of the marginal
cost and marginal revenue curves5° and marginal revenue declines
46 In this case, the profit function looks the same as in supra note 43, but the wage
rate does not change in response to changes in this firm's hiring decision. As a result,
aw/aL equals zero and profit maximization then requires that
a n = P . _ _ =
which provides the expression in the text.
47 Since the actual price paid for the input falls, the firm's average cost flls. This,
however, will not be passed on to consumers in the form of lower output prices. In-
stead, it will be retained as profit by the firm. If the output market is competitive as we
have assumed in the text, the monopsonist will sell its reduced output at the market-
determined price. If the monopsonist has any power in the output market, its reduction
in output will cause the output price to rise. Thus, the effect of monopsony on average
cost similarly has no salutory effect on output price.
48 For sources that examine market power in antitrust, see supra note 32.
49 When a seller has market power, it can control price by adjusting its output. See
Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop, supra note 32.
50 For a firm with market power, the output price is a declining function of the
quantity sold; i.e., the demand is negatively sloped. The firm's profit function is
II = P(Q) x Q- wL - rK
The firm must expand its employment of labor until the marginal impact on profit is
zero:
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as output expands,5 ' an increase in marginal cost will result in a
decrease in the firm's profit-maximizing output. Since the demand
curve has a negative slope, a decrease in quantity leads to an increase
in price. Thus, when a firm with some market power in the sale of
its product acquires monopsony power in the purchase of its inputs,
the prices paid for those inputs decrease, but the marginal cost of
production rises, the monopsonist's output falls, and the price to its
customers actually increases.
In sum, monopsony power is to the demand side of a market
what monopoly power is to the supply side. Monopoly power is
marked by the ability of sellers to raise price above competitive
levels, which requires the ability to limit output. Monopsony power
involves the ability of buyers to lower input prices below competi-
tive levels, which requires the ability to restrict the quantity de-
manded of the input. In either case, the quantity that would be
exchanged is less than the quantity exchanged under competitive
conditions, and the result is allocatively inefficient.52 Ironically, the
reduced input prices the monopsonist enjoys do not lead to reduced
output prices. In fact, when the monopsonist has market power in
its output market, the reduced input prices cause higher output
prices.
B. The Antitrust Response to Pure Monopsony
As we have seen, monopsony power leads a profit-maximizing
firm to restrict the quantity employed of an input, thereby reducing
Oil = (P(Q) + Q ap(Q)) aQ - (w + L(aw/aL)) = 0
Rearranging algebraically yields
P(Q) + Q 1 w + L(Ow/OL)
or in more familiar terms
MR = MFG
where MR is marginal revenue, MFC is marginal factor cost, and MPL is the marginal
product of labor. The right-hand side is marginal cost. See supra note 45 and accompa-
nying text.
51 Marginal revenue is the change in total revenue when quantity is changed by a
small amount. Since total revenue is price times quantity, TR = PQ marginal revenue
is TR/aQ = P+QOP/8Q. If demand is negatively sloped, as it must be when the
seller has market power, OP/OQ must be negative. Thus, marginal revenue
(P+Q.0P/aQ) must be below price (P). As price declines with increases in output, mar-
ginal revenue must also decline. More formally, the slope of MR is given by OMR/OQ
or a(P+Qi0P/aOJ/ aQ=20P/OQ for a linear demand curve, which is negative since
aP/OQ is negative.
52 Allocative inefficiency occurs when too few resources are devoted to an activity:
too little output is produced by a monopolist and too few inputs are hired by a monop-
sonist. On the allocative inefficiency of monopoly, see R. BLAiR & D. KASERmAN, supra
note 12, at 35-37. The allocative inefficiency of monopsony is the subject of this section.
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social welfare. The question thus arises whether an antitrust rem-
edy exists for nonabusive monopsony conduct.53 The simple
answer is "probably not." Consider the case of a "natural" monop-
sony, where productive efficiency requires that there be a single
buyer of an input.M If this buyer makes its purchase decisions ac-
cording to the model developed above, only a restructuring of the
demand side of the market could prevent welfare losses due to allo-
cative inefficiency. 55 This solution, however, is not productively effi-
cient; restructuring would impose welfare losses of uncertain
magnitude.56 Accordingly, following conventional economic rea-
soning, one cannot advocate such a solution. An analogous situa-
tion is that of a natural monopoly that emerged because of
economies of scale.57 Structural relief is undesirable in this context
because it would result in productive inefficiency. Just as section 2
of the Sherman Act 58 does not forbid the structural condition of
monopoly, it should not forbid the structural condition of
monopsony.
There is another possible remedy for nonabusive monopoly or
monopsony: permit the monopoly or monopsony to exist, but regu-
late prices. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits only abuses of
power.59 The question then arises: In cases of either monopoly or
monopsony, would it be an abuse of market power to use that power
merely to influence price? Both practical and theoretical reasons
suggest that section 2 should not prohibit price-only effects. As a
practical matter, such a response would require a court to venture
53 By nonabusive we mean conduct that involves the elimination of competitors
solely by means of product superiority.
54 This is analogous to a natural monopoly where productive efficiency requires
that a single firm produce the total output of the market. Familiar examples include
local telephone service, cable television, and electric power generation and distribution.
See generally SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION
(1988).
55 In other words, a single, large employer could be dismantled into small units to
eliminate its buying power. But this restructuring is apt to introduce productive ineffi-
ciencies since there is an efficiency rationale for the existence of a single, large buyer.
56 A single employer may have monopsony power in a local input market, but sell
its output in a competitive national market. Imposing inefficiency upon such a firm
would raise its costs, render it uncompetitive, and perhaps lead to insolvency.
57 "Natural monopoly generally refers to a property of productive technology, often
in conjunction with market demand, such that a single firm is able to serve the market at
less cost than two or more firms." DANIEL SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETs 3 (1989)
(emphasis in original); see also S. BERG &J. TSCHIRHART, supra note 54.
58 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "[elvery person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nitions, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
59 E.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See generally 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10,
710.
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beyond its traditional, limited role and actually engage in price reg-
ulation. 60 As a theoretical matter, it is the lure of supercompetitive
profits accompanying the exploitation of market power that ulti-
mately leads to a dilution of monopoly or monopsony power by en-
couraging new firms to enter an industry.
As a matter of law, merely charging a monopoly price does not
constitute an abuse of monopoly power.61 The same reasoning has
been applied to the use of monopsony power to lower price. For
example, in Kartell v. Blue Shield,6 2 the court characterized Blue
Shield as a buyer of physician services. A group of physicians chal-
lenged Blue Shield's use of market power as a buyer on the grounds
that Blue Shield could set rates below levels that would exist in a
"freely competitive market." 63 Judge Breyer, writing for the First
Circuit, noted the general judicial reluctance to monitor price in
cases involving monopoly sellers. He then extended that reluctance
to a monopsony buyer in holding that Blue Shield's conduct did not
constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. 64
C. Collusive Monopsony65
In some markets, there are a few large buyers rather than a pure
monopsonist. Economists label this market structure "oligopsony."
Just as oligopoly on the selling side can lead to collusion with results
similar to those created by monopoly, oligopsony can lead to collu-
sion among the few buyers in a market, with results similar to those
produced by monopsony. Acting together, these buyers might col-
lude on terms and depress the price of one or more key inputs used
in their production processes.66 Consequently, collusive monop-
sony has the same deleterious effects on social welfare as does pure
monopsony: too few resources will be employed. Abused suppliers
are hurt by a collusive restraint that reduces the price their output
commands. Moreover, since the suppliers provide less of their
product, the quantity produced of the final good must also de-
cline.67 Consequently, such restraints subtract from social welfare
and should be condemned.
60 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
61 See sources cited supra note 59.
62 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
63 Id. at 926.
64 Id at 927-28.
65 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits combinations "in restraint of trade." 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
66 The buyers' motivation for colluding, of course, is to obtain greater profits. In
other words, the buyers want to convert some producer surplus into consumer surplus.
In Figure 1, the rectangle that is P,-P 2 high and 0Q wide represents producer surplus
that has been converted into consumer surplus by the collusion.
67 See, e.g., National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
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The NCAA and major league baseball provide two interesting.
examples. The NCAA's membership constitutes most of the col-
leges and universities that participate in intercollegiate athletics.
Member schools make collective decisions on a variety of issues.
The NCAA has imposed limitations on the number of scholarships
offered (i.e., the quantity) and the compensation that can be offered
(i.e., the price) to college athletes. 68 Thus, under the auspices of the
NCAA, collusion among these putative rivals has reduced the quan-
tity and price of a major input used in the production of the mem-
bers' final output, college sports.69
Similarly, major league baseball owners legally can agree on the
maximum number of players that each team may carry on its active
roster.70 Recently, they voted to reduce the roster size from twenty-
five to twenty-four, thereby depressing the number of players em-
ployed in major league baseball.7 1
In contrast to pure monopsony, collusive monopsony does not
entail a structural imperative. Rather, collusive monopsony is a be-
havioral problem that can be regulated by the usual antitrust weap-
ons. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that collusive monopsony
violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.72
III
MONOPSONISTIC ABUSES 7 3
A monopsonist or a group of firms collectively possessing mo-
nopsony power may use that power to influence a term of exchange
other than price. Thus, in this Part we will examine both price and
nonprice effects of monopsony. We have four objectives. First, we
demonstrate that courts have generally reached economically sound
results even while following the bright-line tests of past antitrust
policy, which were not based on economic analysis. Second, we
demonstrate that economic analysis supports these judicial out-
68 See Becker, supra note 2.
69 Unlike most cartels, the NCAA can impose severe financial penalties upon mem-
bers that do not comply with the restrictions. Schools can be banned from participating
in bowl games and performing on television-two lucrative sources of revenue. For a
second offense, the NCAA may impose the "death penalty"; a school may be banned
from participating in a particular sport for up to two years. For these and other penal-
ties, see Article 19.4 in the 1990-91 NCAA MANUAL (1990).
70 JoHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LowELL, THE LAw OF SPORTS 480-500 (1979).
71 Roster sizes were temporarily raised to 27 in the aftermath of the 1990 lockout
and are scheduled to return to 25 for the 1991 season. Bring Back the Lockout!I, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 9, 1990, at 20.
72 See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948).
73 The term "monopsonistic abuses" herein indicates either activity by a
monopsonist that would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act or activity by colluding
buyers that would violate section 1 of the Act.
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comes. In so doing, we show that abusive monopsonists do not be-
have precisely as the traditional model predicts. Third, we identify
contexts warranting greater attention to the long-run effects of mo-
nopsony. Finally, we expose substantive and procedural pitfalls cre-
ated by inattention to the economic consequences of monopsony.
A. Price Effects
1. Classical Model
Recall that nonabusive purchasing decisions made by a single
monopsonist who is fully aware of their impact traditionally do not
violate the antitrust laws. 74 Collusion among buyers, however, trig-
gers section 1 of the Sherman Act. For example, in the leading col-
lusive monopsony case, Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 75 sugar refiners in northern California agreed to adopt a
pricing formula that resulted in uniform price offers for sugar beets.
This practice reduced the average price paid to sugar beet growers
to a level below that which would have prevailed in the absence of
the agreement. In finding the agreement unlawful, the United
States Supreme Court cited the general per se illegality of price-
fixing agreements and concluded that: "It is clear that the agree-
ment is the sort of combination condemned by the Act, even though
the price-fixing was by purchasers, and the persons specially injured
under the treble damage claim are sellers, not customers or
consumers."
76
Mandeville Farms is a clear example of a collusive monopsony
practice that has the economic results predicted by traditional the-
ory. It is important to note, however, that if the case were reconsid-
ered today, a court examining the effect of the collusive effort might
conclude that, since prices dropped, the eventual outcome could be
beneficial to consumers.77 This shortsighted impact analysis could
result in a finding of no substantive violation or that the plaintiff-
sellers had suffered no antitrust injury.78
2. Inelastic Supply 79 and Perishable Commodities
The response of a collusive monopsony to inelastic short-run
74 See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
75 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
76 Id. at 235 (footnotes omitted).
77 Recall the similar reasoning in Balmoral Cinema v. Allied Artists Pictures, 885
F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989). See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
78 Antitrust injury is the harm that flows from the anticompetitive consequences of
an antitrust violation. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
For a more complete analysis of antitrust injury, see infra text accompanying notes 194-
221.
79 When supply is perfectly inelastic, the quantity does not adjust when price
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supply is similar to that predicted by the traditional model. With an
inelastic short-run supply, the free interaction of supply and de-
mand would result in a price increase in the event of a shortage.
One of the earliest collusive monopsony cases involved the fixed
supply model.
In National Macaroni Manufacturers Association v. FTC,s0 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that an attempt by a buying cartel of macaroni
manufacturers to control the price paid for one of its primary inputs
was unlawful. High quality macaroni requires the use of one hun-
dred percent durum wheat, which is easy for the manufacturers to
use and yields a macaroni product with the most desirable cooking
properties.81 In the absence of any supply disruptions, the intersec-
tion of demand and supply determines the free market equilibrium
price and quantity of durum wheat. In Figure 2, this intersection
occurs at price P1 and quantity Q1. The original supply curve is
drawn as a vertical line at quantity Q, reflecting that, during a grow-
ing season, the maximum quantity supplied cannot respond to
changes in price.8 2
changes, i.e., the quantity supplied is completely unresponsive to changes in price. See
RIcHARD G. IAPSEY, PETER 0. STEINER & DOUGLAS D. PURVIS, ECONoMicS 89 (8th ed.
1987).
80 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
81 Id. at 424.
82 This is not strictly accurate since a rise in price may spur more careful tending or
make more intensive harvesting profitable, but characterization of short-run supply as
inelastic is a useful approximation.
1991] 311
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 2
PRICE
SUPPLY AFTER
CROP FAILURE
P2
P1
DEMAND
COLLUSIVE
DEMAND
0 Q2 Q1 TONS OF DURUM WHEAT
During the relevant growing season in National Macaroni, major
crop damage curtailed the supply of durum wheat. The maximum
supply fell to Q,2.8 3 Unfettered competition among buyers for the
reduced quantity of durum wheat should have driven the price up to
P2. But this result did not occur.
The macaroni manufacturers agreed among themselves to alter
their recipe. Instead of using 100 percent durum wheat, they
agreed to use a blend of 50 percent durum wheat and 50 percent
farina.8 4 The agreement artificially depressed the demand for du-
rum wheat to the "collusive demand" level, thereby maintaining the
original price.8 5 The Seventh Circuit found that the agreement was
a per se violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
83 The supply curve after the crop damage is shown as one-half of the pre-failure
supply. We use this for illustrative purposes.
84 National Macaroni, 345 F.2d at 424.
85 Id. at 426.
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Act.86 This holding provided symmetrical treatment of collusive
monopoly and monopsony behavior. When sellers generate a sur-
plus, the supply may be so great that prices and resulting profits fall.
The antitrust laws do not permit these sellers to collude in order to
boost their prices and profits. Similarly, National Macaroni teaches
that when shortages increase prices and perhaps profits, buyers may
not collude to reduce those prices.
a. The Role of Perishability
In our analysis of National Macaroni, we assumed that the sellers
had a perfectly inelastic supply curve. This assumption is inaccurate
if the farmers had the option of withholding some output from the
market in hopes of higher prices in future years.8 7 Our analysis is
entirely appropriate, however, for cases involving perishable com-
modities. Perishability makes short-run supply perfectly inelastic
because restricting output involves no cost savings. The protracted
litigation between beef producers and grocery store chains and the
continuous controversy surrounding the free-agency rights of pro-
fessional athletes both illustrate the perishability concept. In In re
Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation,"8 the plaintiff-beef producers alleged
that grocery store chains were colluding to depress the price of
beef.8 9 The plaintiffs noted that the supply of beef was fixed in the
short run because a fattened steer must be sold within three weeks
of the time it becomes "choice grade."90 This left the plaintiffs
completely unable to withhold output in response to a collusively
determined price. The problem in this case did not involve a
shortage but merely a fixed supply.91 In other words, the supply
curve would be vertical at quantity OQ in Figure 2. Once again, the
alleged collusion was designed to move the demand curve to a lower
level, thereby decreasing the price.92
86 Id. at 427. Section 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "[u]nfair meth-
ods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
87 This option is not free, of course, since one must incur storage costs. Moreover,
sales revenue received in the future must be discounted to present value.
88 542 F. Supp. 1122 (N.D. Tex. 1982), aft'd, 710 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984). The issue on appeal was whether the producers of beef,
who were indirectly affected by the alleged bid rigging, had antitrust standing.
89 The beef producers also accused the beef packers of a similar conspiracy. In re
Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,277 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
90 Id.
91 Similar analysis applies to poultry, other livestock, fish, and ripened fruits. Con-
sider the options available to a tuna boat, for example, as it pulls into port. If the can-
neries collude on price, the vessel owner has almost no options. All costs are sunk and
any positive price is preferable to throwing the fish away.
92 Although the court was not persuaded by the cattle ranchers, some economists
have confirmed these price effects. For example, Professor Bruce Marion of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin has pointed to research showing that concentration among buyers has
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A similar, but more severe, problem confronts professional ath-
letes and other workers. Labor is an extremely perishable commod-
ity-an hour not worked today can never be recovered. Although
professional athletes have alternative occupations, those with real
talent are so scarce that their wages as athletes are generally well
above the wages available in their next most lucrative endeavor. Ac-
cordingly, the supply of labor effort for each individual athlete is
quite inelastic. Collusion among employers can drive the wage
down to the individual's reservation wage.93 The purpose of the
baseball owners' agreement to prohibit free agency is to insure that
they will be able to behave as a collusive monopsony in the market
for professional athletes' services. 94
b. The Prevalence of Bid Rigging
Bid rigging appears to be an especially popular form of collu-
sive monopsony in circumstances of inelastic supply. In addition to
bid rigging among antique dealers at estate auctions, 95 collusive ar-
rangements have emerged at auctions of used commercial equip-
ment in Pennsylvania96 and California. 97 In these cases, putative
rival buyers agree in advance not to bid against each other at public
auctions. 98 Given the inelastic supply of antiques or used commer-
cial equipment, the winning "bidder" can offer a low price with the
assurance that no one else will offer a higher price.99 Following the
public auction, the bid riggers conduct a private auction among
reduced prices to cattle farmers. In light of this research, Professor Marion has asserted
that this monopsony can result in substantial underpayment to farmers. Witnesses Differ
on Effect of Increased Concentration in Food Sector, 54 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
819, 820 (May 12, 1988).
93 But see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTNGS LJ. 65 (1982).
94 The best known challenge to this practice is Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
95 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Antique Dealers Face Price Fixing
Charges, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 117, 117 (July 23, 1987) (Charles F. Rule
reported that the Antitrust Division of the Department ofJustice had "a number of in-
vestigations focusing on auction pools in a variety of commodity areas").
96 United States v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., Crim. No. 88-00281 (E.D. Pa. July
18, 1988).
97 United States v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., Crim. No. 88-0391 RFP (N.D. Cal.
June 22, 1988).
98 This raises the interesting question of how entry is prevented. In the case of the
antique auctions, for example, the large antique dealers were involved but not the ama-
teur collectors. What prevented the amateurs from bidding more than the profession-
als? There are at least two possible explanations. First, it may be true that the antique
dealers can bid higher than the collectors and still resell for a profit in the national
antique market. Second, the dealers are better able to estimate the value of the antiques
for sale. If the amateur collectors undervalue the antiques, then the professionals can
profit. Obviously, the opposite can occur: an amateur may overestimate the true market
value of an item. In that case, the professionals will not be able to buy it.
99 No one in the buying cartel can cheat for long on his fellow conspirators by
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themselves. On each unit purchased, the difference between the
winning bid in the private auction and the rigged bid in the public
auction provides a pool of collusive profits. These profits are shared
among the collusive monopsonists in proportions that cannot be de-
termined on an a priori basis.100 The result of such bid rigging is to
deny the prior owners the full market value of their goods.
"Split" agreements among movie theatres supposedly in com-
petition provide another example of bid rigging.10 1 Competitive
bidding among exhibitors (i.e., the movie theatres) for soon-to-be
released films could result in large cash guarantees, high license
fees, and other terms unfavorable to the exhibitors. To avoid such
an outcome, the theatres may agree to refrain from competing with
each other, i.e., to "split" the films among themselves. Their inten-
tion, of course, is to obtain the same number of films, but on more
favorable terms. 0 2
A final example of bid rigging is the timber auction in United
States v. Portac, Inc. 03 In Portac, the U.S. Forest Service decided to
auction off timber on forest service land. The Astoria Plywood Cor-
poration "won" the sale due to an agreement providing that the
other potential bidders would refrain from competing.. The logs
from the sale were subsequently allocated among the conspirators
and Portac, a sawmill company. The buyers' purpose, once again,
was to keep input costs down, resulting in the denial of full value to
the seller.
c. Long-Run Welfare Consequences of Collusion in the Context of
Inelastic Supply
We have already demonstrated that the efforts of collusive
monopsonists to obtain lower prices do not translate into lower
prices for consumers. 104 Further economic consequences, however,
particularly in the context of inelastic supply, require specific atten-
offering a higher price. Such behavior would be detected immediately and would cause
the cartel to collapse.
100 Any profit-sharing rule could be used, provided that it did not lead to so much
dissatisfaction among the colluders that the buying cartel would break down. There is
no unique profit-sharing rule to guarantee cartel stability. FREDERICK M. SCHERER &
DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 248 (3d ed.
1990).
101 For examples, see Movie 1 & 2 v. United Artists Communicatures, Inc., 909 F.2d
1245 (9th Cir. 1990); Balmoral Cinema v. Allied Artists Pictures, 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir.
1989); Southway Theatres v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Capitol Serv. Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 756 F.2d 502 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 945 (1985).
102 The Antitrust Division has begun to file criminal cases involving splits. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cinemette Corp. of Am., 687 F. Supp. 976 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
103 869 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1989).
104 See supra text accompanying notes 42-52.
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tion. Since supply is inelastic, the collusion among buyers will have
little impact on quantity in the short run. Thus, in these circum-
stances, collusion among buyers to depress demand artificially has
only distributional significance in the short run. In the durum wheat
example in Figure 2, since the quantity is fixed at Q2 after the crop
failure, the effect of collusion is to redistribute wealth: suppliers will
receive less for their wheat. Instead of receiving P2 Q dollars for
the crop, farmers will receive only PIQ2. The difference,
(P2-PI)Q2, provides a return to the colluders.
Ordinarily, economic objections to collusion do not involve dis-
tributional issues; this is true here as well.10 5 But collusion creates
expectations that have long-run significance. As their profits are re-
duced by collusion, the producers' incentives to plant durum wheat
diminish and they will curtail supply in the future.10 6 Such reduc-
tions in supply entail adverse consequences for consumer welfare in
the future.
This analysis suggests that the National Macaroni decision,
which reached its result by adhering to the bright-line test prohibit-
ing price fixing, is sensible even under modem economic analysis.
It implicitly recognizes that, even in cases where supply is fixed and
reductions in quantity are not possible in the short run, monop-
sonistic collusion harms consumers by reducing the producers'
profits, causing them to reduce supply in the future. Consequently,
such restraints decrease consumer welfare in the long run and
should be prohibited.
3. All-Or-None Supply Cases
According to the classical model of monopsony, the monop-
sonist must reduce the quantity that it purchases in order to obtain
lower prices. The monopsonist, however, would prefer to pay the
lower price without reducing the quantity purchased. This is impos-
sible unless the monopsonist can push the sellers onto their all-or-
none supply curve. 10 7 Since this concept may be somewhat unfamil-
iar, we digress to give a brief explanation.
The standard supply curve reveals the answer to the following
question: What is the quantity that suppliers will provide at a given
price? By answering this question for various given prices, one ob-
tains the price-quantity combinations that form the usual supply
105 Others stress political concerns. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979).
106 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 118-20 (1976) (compact discussion of
supply).
107 Id at 16.
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curve. 10 8 The choice confronting the seller is how much to supply
at a particular price. The all-or-none supply curve, however, is a
different matter. It answers the question: What is the maximum
quantity suppliers will make available at each price when the alterna-
tive is to sell nothing at all? 10 9 Accordingly, the all-or-none supply
curve lies below the standard supply curve. 1 0 Knowledge of the all-
or-none supply curve enables the monopsonist to fully exploit its
power by extracting all of the producer surplus.
Consider the demand that a group of firms have for a particular
input, for example, the venerable widget, as shown in Figure 3. The
usual supply curve of widgets is also shown. The interaction of this
supply and demand determines an equilibrium price and quantity in
a competitive widget market of P, and Q1. Now, suppose that the
buyers get together and exert their collective buying power over the
diverse group of suppliers. One strategy would be to restrict
purchases below Q, and thereby depress price below P1. Alterna-
tively, however, the buyers could impose all-or-none decisions upon
the unorganized group of suppliers. In fact, they can push the sup-
pliers off the traditional supply curve and onto the all-or-none sup-
ply curve at the quantity Q1, which is the privately optimal quantity
for the colluding buyers."' The price actually paid falls from P1 to
P 2 without any reduction in the quantity transacted.1i 2
108 Id at 118.
109 P. RIcHARD G. LAYARD & ALAN A. WALTERS, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 244 (1978)
("Lying below the supply curve is the seller's all-or-nothing price, showing the minimum
price per unit at which he is willing to sell each quantity.").
110 See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 106, at 118.
111 This is the privately (as opposed to socially) optimal quantity in the sense that
the buyers' profits are maximized with quantity Q. and price P2.
112 The success of this collusive effort hinges on the credibility of the threat to refuse
to buy anything. With many sellers, such a threat may be perceived as credible because
each seller knows that the buyer can turn to rival sellers. In contrast, if there were only
one seller, the collusive threat to buy nothing at all would not be credible.
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The short-run consequences of the all-or-none scenario are
purely distributional, which is not to say they are unimportant.118
All of the producer surplus is transferred to the colluding buyers.
In Figure 3, the noncollusive consumer surplus is the area ABPI,
and the producer surplus is CBP,. After imposing all-or-none con-
ditions upon the suppliers, the collusive monopsonists increase
their consumer surplus by the rectangular area PIBEP2. This comes
at the expense of producers, whose producer surplus has been re-
duced by the same area. 14 Note that the area above the supply
curve and below P2 (i.e., area CFP2 ) is equal to area EFB, and there-
fore, producer surplus is zero. 115 Thus, the buyers have extracted
113 For examinations of distributive issues, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Jus-
tice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Lande, supra note 93.
114 This can be proven with plane geometry. Triangles CFP 2 and EFB are similar
right triangles. Since the bases P2F and FE are of equal length, the triangles are congru-
ent and, therefore, the areas are the same.
115 There is no producer surplus above the all-or-none supply curve. For example,
area CEP2 does not represent consumer surplus. The all-or-none supply represents-by
construction-the supply response when all producer surplus has been removed.
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all of the producer surplus through their collusive efforts. Although
this type of collusion does not reduce output in the short run, it may
in the long run. Firms will leave the industry in the long run if the
price offered is below average total cost.
The all-or-none model seems to fit recent cases in which health
care providers challenge the monopsonistic pricing practices of
health care insurers.1 16 The providers typically object to the maxi-
mum price the insurer has offered. The insurers probably prefer
not to reduce the quantity of medical services available. The long
run consequences are, however, difficult to predict. For example, in
Kartell v. Blue Shield, 17 a group of physicians challenged the pricing
policies of Blue Shield, which offered reimbursement on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis." 8 The plaintiffs contended that the rates were set
so low as to discourage entry into the physician services market." 9
If empirically accurate, this argument would support the possibility
of long-run misallocative effects of monopsony pricing.
In a sense, this long-run effect may seem counter-intuitive be-
cause the monopsonist's interests are not served by pricing so low
that there is a long-run exit of sellers.' 20 In principle, this exit
would alter the balance of bargaining power in favor of the remain-
ing sellers. 12 1 Indeed, in a world of perfect information one might
imagine the monopsonist pegging a price that permits just the right
number of sellers to comfortably stay in business. This argument
rests on unrealistic assumptions about the availabilty of information
and the rationality of business conduct. Thus, in the context of real
116 See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1029 (1985); Medical Arts Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Cross, Inc., 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir.
1982); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Gross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093
(1973); Pennsylvania Dentist Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 574 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa.
1983).
117 749 F.2d 922 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985). Challenges such
as this, brought under section I of the Sherman Act, usually fal because an insurer is a
single buyer and can unilaterally shop for favorable terms. See PHILIuP AREEDA & Louis
KAPLOW, ANTruST ANALYsis 251 n.27 (1988).
118 Kartell, 749 F.2d at 923-24. Another example of an all-or-none situation appears
to be All Care Nursing Serv. v. Bethesda Memorial Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535 (11 th Cir.
1989).
119 Kartell, 749 F.2d at 924.
120 Whether such a strategy makes economic sense from a monopsonist's private
perspective is revealed by the present value of the flow of benefits and costs. Since the
costs of firms' exiting will be incurred in the distant future, they will be discounted far
more heavily than will the immediate benefits of monopsonistic exploitation.
121 This could eventually lead to something approximating bilateral monopoly,
which poses a different set of problems. See generally Roger D. Blair & David L.
Kaserman, A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula Price Contracts, 77 Am. EcoN. Rv. 460
(1987); Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman & Richard E. Romano, A Pedagogical Treatment
of Bilateral Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831 (1989); Richard Friedman, Antitrust Analysis and
Bilateral Monopoly, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 873.
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world business behavior, closer attention to long-run welfare conse-
quences is warranted.
B. Nonprice Effects: The Abuse of Monopsonistic Leverage1 22
The purest monopsony cases, like Mandeville Island Farms ,v.
American Crystal Sugar, Co. 123 and National Macaroni Manufacturers Asso-
ciation v. FTC,124 involve efforts to control demand and lower prices.
Just as in monopoly cases, there are instances in which the "abuse"
of power is not designed to lower prices but to exact some other
form of advantage for the monopsonist. For example, in the well-
known "monopolization" case of United States v. Griffith,125 the de-
fendant operated a chain of movie theatres that purchased exhibi-
tion rights from film distributors. In some towns, the defendant was
the only exhibitor; in others it faced competition.' 26 It possessed
monopsony power in the towns in which it faced no competition
because it was the only buyer. The defendant made its purchases of
film exhibition rights contingent on the distributors' agreement that
the defendant would have exclusive rights to films in the markets in
which it faced competition.127 In essence, rather than use its mo-
nopsony power to demand the lowest possible rental fees in each
market, the concession exacted was in the form of exclusive exhibi-
tion rights for the entire circuit. Monopsony power was used to en-
hance the buyer's monopoly in those markets where it faced
competition as a seller. Without specifically noting the monopsony
character of the power exercised, the United States Supreme Court
held that the practice violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.' 28
The Supreme Court implicitly condemned the abuse of monop-
sony power again in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores.129 The defen-
dant, Broadway Hale, owned a chain of department stores and used
what the Court described as its "'monopolistic' buying power" as a
means of convincing several manufacturers of appliances not to deal
with Klor's, a small, single-outlet retailer in competition with Broad-
way Hale. 130 Rather than concentrate its monopsony power on ob-
122 See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 CoLuM. L. REv.
515 (1985) (recent examination of monopoly leveraging). Although Professor Kaplow
revives the traditional leverage theory whereby a firm uses power in one market to
obtain power in another market, that is not our concern here. The cases in this section
deal with the use of power as a buyer to gain power as a seller.
123 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
124 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
125 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
126 Id at 102.
127 Id. at 103.
128 Id. at 106-07.
129 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
1so Id. at 209-10.
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tamining the lowest possible price from the manufacturers, the
"monopsonist" exacted a non-price concession in the form of a re-
fusal to sell to a competitor. In an opinion that can be regarded as
declaring group boycotts illegal per se, 131 the Court held the prac-
tice unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act.'3 2
Similarly, in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co. ,1ss the
defendant was a producer and distributor of advertising films shown
at movie theatres. It bought time from theatres on the condition
that they would not sell time to competing producers of advertising
films. 13 4 In essence, the defendant required sellers to enter into an
outputs contract under which all their advertising time was sold to
the defendant.' 3 5
In Griffith,'3 6 Klor's,13 7 and Motion Picture Advertising Service Co. ,138
monopsony power was not used to negotiate a lower price for the
buyers. l3 9 Instead, the defendants used their monopsony power to
curtail the availability of an input to their competitors, thereby en-
hancing the position of the defendants as sellers. The impact on
the input markets seem to be purely distributive in conformance
with the all-or-none model, while the more serious economic impact
was probably on the output markets. In these instances, the Court
reached outcomes consistent with established economic objectives
by focusing on the results of increased monopoly power.
IV
MONOPSONY AND MERGER POLICY'
4 0
A monopsony issue in the area of horizontal mergers arises when
one buyer acquires another, thereby increasing the possibility of an
undesirable concentration of power on the buying side of the mar-
ket. 14 1 The monopsony issue in the context of vertical mergers
arises when a firm acquires one of its suppliers. The motivations
131 See LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, ANITrRUST 236 (1977).
132 K/or's, 359 U.S. at 210.
133 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
134 Id. at 393.
135 The Court upheld an FTC order limiting the length of the contracts. Id at 394-
98.
136 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
137 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
138 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
139 See also Eastern States Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914).
140 Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers where the effect "may be to
substantially lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1988).
141 See supra notes 42-52 (contending that concentrated buying power can have dele-
terious effects on price). But see 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, 963-65
(expressing less concern about buying power than about selling power).
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and the welfare significance of horizontal and vertical mergers, how-
ever, are quite distinct. Consequently, we will treat horizontal and
vertical mergers separately in this section. 142
A. Horizontal Mergers 45
A series of horizontal mergers among firms that buy the same
inputs may lead to a case of pure monopsony. In other instances,
the merger may result in a dominant firm in a market with several
smaller or fringe buyers. In both cases, the merger-to-monopsony
need not involve monopoly in the output market.144 For example, a
series of mergers could result in a single exhibitor controlling all of
the movie theatres in a geographic area.145 One could argue that
the single exhibitor has a monopsony in the area since no one else
licenses movies, despite the existence of media substitutes (i.e., tele-
vision, radio, plays, concerts, shows, and the like), which effectively
blunts the exhibitor's monopoly power.146
To keep the analysis focused, we shall assume monopsony
power without any corresponding monopoly power. Even in this
case, the merged monopsonist imposes welfare losses on society.
Regardless of whether the result of the merger is a pure monopsony
or the emergence of a dominant buyer, 147 the welfare consequences
142 Conglomerate mergers are irrelevant to the present discussion of monopsony.
143 See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, 963-65 (brief treatment of buyer
concentration).
144 The Department ofJustice Merger Guidelines proscribe mergers that create or
enhance market power.
145 This was an issue raised for the first time in a post-trial brief by the government
in United States v. Syufy Enter., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 903 F.2d
659 (9th Cir. 1990). See infra text accompanying notes 160-64 (discussion of Syufj).
146 Since United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), the rele-
vant product in motion picture cases has been first-run exhibition of motion pictures.
See, e.g., Syufy, 712 F. Supp. at 1397. But see Charles McCoy, The Paramount Cases: Golden
Anniversary in A Rapidly Changing Marketplace, ANrrRusT, Summer 1988, at 32-35 (calling
for a rethinking given modern realities).
147 A series of mergers is more likely to produce a dominant buyer than a pure
monopsonist. The welfare effects, however, do not vary depending on the ultimate mar-
ket structure. A dominant buyer recognizes that its purchase decisions influence the
market price of some input. The fringe of competitive buyers accepts the price that the
dominant firm pays as the market determined price. That fringe group of buyers will
buy the input up to the point where .its demand equals the price set by the dominant
buyer. The dominant buyer must adjust its purchases subject to the behavior of the
other buyers in order to maximize profit.
are similar to those of the classical monopsonist. 148 Unless the so-
cial welfare losses are offset by productive efficiencies, the mergers
should be proscribed.' 49
As in the case of a horizontal merger of competing sellers, the
critical issue is to determine the level of market power enjoyed by
the newly merged firm. The most commonly employed indicator of
market power is market share.' 50 Here, the most difficult issue is to
PRICE
Ddf
0 f 0 df QUANTITY
In the Figure, Df represents the demand for the input in question by the competi-
tive fringe, Ddr represents the demand of the dominant firm, and S is the supply curve.
The dominant firm recognizes that at any price the competitive fringe will purchase as
any competitive firm would, viz., where Df equals the price. It incorporates this behavior
by subtracting Dr from S to obtain the residual supply, which is denoted by S, in the
Figure. The curve represents the marginal costs of expanding the dominant buyer's
purchases, i.e., its marginal factor cost.
The balance of the analysis is familiar: the dominant buyer purchases Q~r where
MFC equals Ddf, which determines price equal to P* from the residual supply. At a price
of P*, the fringe will purchase Q.f where P* equals Df. At P*, sellers will provide Q*,
which is equal to the sum of Q and Qr. Since the dominant firm restricts its purchases
below the quantity where demand (Dde) equals supply (S,), there are welfare losses.
148 See supra notes 32-72 and accompanying text.
149 See Oliver Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58
AM. EcoN. REv. 18 (1968) (first proposal for efficiency defense).
150 Market share is an unsatisfactory measure of market power. See Landes & Pos-
1991] 323MONOPSONY
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
define the product market. All products that are "reasonably inter-
changeable" to buyers should be included in the market.151 The
level of interchangeability will depend on how quickly buyers re-
spond to price changes by altering their buying patterns. Thus, if
buyers turn quickly to other sellers of the same product or sellers of
different products as soon as one seller raises prices, the alternatives
should be included in the product market. Technically, the propen-
sity to change in response to price changes is measured by the elas-
ticity of demand 52 or the cross-elasticity of demand.' 53 The
responsiveness of potential sellers to price increases as measured by
supply elasticity limits market power.154 Thus, even when a firm has
a large market share, if a price increase encourages firms to enter
the market, the market power of the firm is diminished.
These factors are reversed in the case of monopsony. First, the
market is not the market of competing sellers but of competing buy-
ers. This market is comprised of buyers who are seen by sellers as
being reasonably good substitutes. The greater the number of good
substitutes from the point of view of sellers, the lower the monop-
sony power of the merged firm. In a sense, the sellers may substi-
tute away from low paying buyers in favor of higher paying buyers.
This tendency is measured by their supply elasticity for the merged
buyers. Also dampening the power of the monopsonist is the ability
of new buyers to enter the market in response to artificially de-
pressed price. Here, a high elasticity of demand will lessen monop-
sony power.
Although hardly an everyday occurrence, courts have consid-
ered cases involving merger-to-monopsony. In United States v. Rice
Growers Association of California,t55 the Department of Justice chal-
lenged a merger of firms engaged in the purchase, milling, and re-
ner, supra note 32. Some courts agree. E.g., Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores,
Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1414 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Market share indicates market power only
when sales reflect control of the productive assets in the business, for only then does it
reflect an ability to curtail total market output.").
151 United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) ("no
more definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by
consumers for the same purposes make up that 'part of the trade or commerce,' monop-
olization of which may be illegal.").
152 Elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of the quantity purchased to
changes in price and is calculated as the percentage change in quantity divided by the
percentage change in price.
153 Cross-elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of the quantity sold of
one good to changes in the price of a different good. It is calculated as the percentage
change in the quantity of good X divided by the percentage change in the price of good
Y. See R. BLAIR & L. KENNY, supra note 39, at 60-61, 65-66.
154 Supply elasticity measures the relative responsiveness of the quantity supplied to
changes in price. It is calculated as the percentage change in quantity supplied divided
by the percentage change in the price. See W. NICHOLSON, supra note 36, at 361.
155 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,288 (E.D. Cal., Jan. 31, 1986).
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sale of rice on a number of grounds, including the possibility that it
would "substantially . . . lessen competition in the market for the
purchase or acquisition for milling of paddy rice grown in Califor-
nia." 156 The court held that the acquisition did indeed violate sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act because of the decrease in competition
among purchasers. 157
In so holding, the court engaged in the appropriate market
analysis. Specifically, it noted that California rice growers "perceive
the California rice mills to be their best alternative for the sale of
paddy rice."' 58 In addition, it was not feasible for growers to shift
to other crops. In effect, the court explored the possibility of substi-
tute buyers and concluded that the rice growers' supply was rela-
tively inelastic. The court found it unlikely that there would be
entry of new buyers for the rice as its price was forced down, be-
cause shipment to other parts of the country or overseas was eco-
nomically infeasible. 159
A more recent merger case illustrates the problems that can
arise in identifying the relevant market. In United States v. Syufy En-
terprises,160 the government challenged the acquisition practices of a
movie theatre chain in the Las Vegas market under section 2 of the
Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. At trial, the govern-
ment based its case on the possible anticompetitive effects of the
acquisition in the market for the first-run exhibition of films, i.e., the
output market. 161 Apparently, the evidence regarding market defi-
nition tended to show that there were good substitutes in the eyes of
consumers for first-run films and that good substitutes might appear
in the market if prices rose. Hence, in a post-trial brief the govern-
ment made a merger-to-monopsony argument based on Rice Grow-
ers, and cited the impact on film distributors as the harm to be
avoided.' 62
The court dismissed the argument as an effort by the govern-
ment to reduce the relevance of the demand elasticity of consum-
ers. 163 The court noted that the government could not begin with
one theory of impact and then, when the market definition began to
favor the defendants, change to a theory that had not been
presented at trial.164 Clearly, the government discovered the
156 Id. at 61,466.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 61,462.
159 Id. at 61,464.
160 712 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990).
161 Id. at 1398.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1397-98.
164 Id. at 1397-99.
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merger-to-monopsony theory too late. If Syufy's acquisitions
harmed anyone, it was the distributors of films. Consequently, the
government should have focused on the availability of alternative
outlets to the sellers from the outset of the litigation.
B. Vertical Mergers
Since 1971, the motives for vertical integration have received a
great deal of attention.165 Most of the attention has focused on the
incentives for an intermediate good monopolist to integrate toward
the downstream stage. 166 'Less attention has been paid to the theory
of upstream vertical integration by a monopsonist. 167 There is,
however, a strong incentive for a monopsonist to integrate up-
stream and acquire its input suppliers.
In Figure 4, the monopsonist's derived demand curve for an
input is shown as the downward-sloping marginal revenue product
curve (MRP). 68 AC represents the industry average cost of produc-
ing the input. The industry's marginal cost curve, which corre-
sponds to the industry supply curve, is MC. The industry supply
curve shows the average purchase price to the monopsonist for any
particular quantity. In contrast, the marginal factor cost (MFC) rep-
resents the marginal cost to the monopsonist of increasing the em-
ployment of this input. The MFC lies above the supply curve
because increases in the employment of this input require paying
increased prices. Since the higher price must be paid for all units of
the input, the marginal impact upon total expenditures (MFG) ex-
ceeds the price, which is the average impact. 169 In the absence of
vertical integration, the monopsonist will employ Q, units of input
165 Interestingly, the burst of attention was spawned by a two-page note which redis-
covered an earlier result. See M.L. Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L.
REV. 62 (1960); John Vernon & Daniel Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical
Integration, 79J. POL. ECON. 924 (1971).
166 A good deal of this literature has been surveyed. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN,
supra note 12, at 283-320; David L. Kaserman, Theories of Vertical Integration: Implications
for Antitrust Policy, 23 ANTrrRusT BuLL. 483 (1978).
167 See Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: The Monopsony Case, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 561
(1978). There are other treatments that are not as thorough but are still useful. See
ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION
AND CONTROL 114-20 (1983); John S. McGee & Lowell R. Bassett, Vertical Integration Re-
visited, 19 J.L. & EcON. 17 (1976); S.Y. Wu, The Effects of Vertical Integration on Price and
Output, 2 W. EcON.J. 117 (1964).
168 The marginal revenue product of an input is the product of marginal revenue
and marginal product. When a firm employs an additional unit of an input, the amount
by which total output rises equals the input's marginal product. The value of the added
output is given by the marginal revenue. Thus, marginal revenue times marginal prod-
uct represents the marginal value to the employer of having additional inputs, which is
why the MRP curve is the demand for the input. See, e.g., R. BLAIR & L. KENNY, supra
note 39, at 342-43.
169 Since the total cost of employing X is Px X Qx where Px is an increasing function
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as determined by the intersection of MRP and MFC at point B. At
this level of employment, the area ABQ10 represents the monop-
sonist's total revenue. Total cost is equal to price times quantity
P1Q1 , which equals the area PCQ10. Consequently, the
nonintegrated monopsonist's maximum profits equal the area
ABCPI.
FIGURE 4
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With complete vertical integration, the profit-maximizing em-
ployment of the input increases to 0.2 as determined by the intersec-
tion of MRP and MC at point D.170 Here, total revenue is area
ADQ20, and total cost is area FEQO0. Thus, the fully integrated
of X, the marginal effect of expanding employment is the marginal factor cost: ( (Px X
Q.x)/OQ~x = P + Qx(OPx/OQx) > Px since 0(Px x Qx)/OQx > 0 by hypothesis.
170 Following the vertical integration, the firm will look at the marginal cost of pro-
during the input rather than the marginal cost of buying the input in reaching its employ-
ment decisions.
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firm's maximum profits are equal to the area ADEF. The shaded
area PICBDEF represents the gross increase in profits that results
from vertical integration by the monopsonist. This profit increase
provides the incentive for vertical integration. Whether this is ac-
complished through merger or internal expansion depends upon
the relative costs of the two avenues.
The increased profits resulting from vertical integration flow
from two sources. The first source is that portion of the upstream
industry's pre-integration rents that are captured by the monop-
sonist. 171 Area PCGF represents this "rent effect." The second
source of increased profits arises from eliminating the efficiency loss
due to under-employing the monopsonized input in the absence of
vertical integration. This is the "efficiency effect," and it is shown as
area GBDE in the graph. 172 The relative sizes of these two effects
depend upon the slope of the MRP curve. As MRP flattens, the "ef-
ficiency effect" grows and the "rent effect" decreases. This increase
in profits represents the gross benefits to the monopsonist of ac-
quiring productive capacity at the upstream stage. As long as the
costs of acquisition are smaller than these gross benefits, the acqui-
sition will occur. 173
The welfare effects of the monopsonist's backward vertical inte-
gration are unambiguously positive. As the monopsonist vertically
integrates, the employment of the monopsonized input increases.
This results in greater output of the final good at a lower price. If
the monopsonist is a perfect competitor in the output market, the
price reduction will be very slight.' 74 But if the monopsonist has
some market power in the final good market, the price reduction
may be quite substantial.175 In either event, consumers are not hurt
by the vertical integration. In the example discussed above, the ac-
quiring firm was a pure monopsonist. The same effects also follow
in the case of purchasers with a lower level of monopsony power.
Market foreclosure is the main objection to vertical mergers.' 76
171 See Perry, supra note 167, at 568-69 (labelling this the "rent effect").
172 See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 167, at 118.
173 Id. at 118-20.
174 When a firm is a perfect competitor in the output market, it is very small relative
to the industry as a whole. Thus, any output change by a single firm cannot have much
impact on price. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 12, at 3-4.
175 When a firm has market power, its output decisions have a measurable impact
upon price. See sources cited supra note 32.
176 The most recent Supreme Court decision on vertical integration is Ford Motor
Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972), which involved Ford's acquisition of Electric
Autolite, a sparkplug manufacturer. The trial court objected to the acquisition because
of "the foreclosure of Ford as a purchaser of about ten per cent of total industry out-
put." Id at 568 (quoting United States v. Ford Motor Co., 315 F. Supp. 372, 375 (E.D.
Mich. 1971)).
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In the case of pure monopsony, however, there is no actual foreclo-
sure. Since the monopsonist bought all of the upstream industry's
pre-integration output, the merger forecloses no rival purchaser
from this source of supply. Similarly, since the monopsonist will
buy all of the input suppliers, there will be no independent suppliers
and thus no foreclosure from selling to the monopsonist.
A stronger possibility of foreclosure arises when the acquiring
firm is not a pure monopsonist. It is then possible that other pur-
chasers will be unable to obtain the input. In addition, the in-
dependent suppliers will have one less outlet. As one commentator
has shown, this possibility may not be a real concern. 177 If the ac-
quiring firm obtains its output from the acquired firm, the output of
the other suppliers would still be available to the competing pur-
chasers. In the extreme, the acquiring firm may acquire all the pro-
ducers of the input and become a monopolist in the input market.
Here, however, the horizontal concerns about monopolists would
apply.
Potential foreclosure is a variation on the foreclosure issue. 178
If another buyer enters that industry, it will have no source of sup-
ply. This may constitute a barrier to entry because it requires a new
entrant to be vertically integrated. But entry occurs in response to
excess profits. If there are excess profits, that a new entrant must
enter at both levels can only delay entry-it cannot prevent it. 17
This delay, however, is valuable to the established firm because it
extends the period during which the firm earns excess profits. In
sum, an accurate determination of the competitive effect of a
monopsonist's upstream vertical integration requires the deci-
sionmaker to weigh the certain and immediate gain in consumer
welfare against the problem of potential foreclosure. 80
V
MONOPSONY AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which amended section 2 of
177 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 231-38 (1978).
178 For a brief examination, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 196-201
(1976), and R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 12, at 314-16.
179 Under "real world" conditions, entry is not free, i.e., it involves some transaction
costs. Thus, entry can only occur if the transaction costs associated with entry do not
exceed the gains to be had by entry.
180 Another possible concern about vertical integration involves so-called price
squeezes. These usually involve a manufacturer of an intermediate good that fabricates
some of its output and sells the rest to nonintegrated fabricators. A price squeeze occurs
when the manufacturer raises the price of the intermediate good but holds down the
price on the fabricated good. See, e.g., Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
752 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986). This concern does not
apply to our case.
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the Clayton Act, forbids price discrimination when it is apt to have
an anticompetitive effect.'18 Most of the Robinson-Patman Act does
not address the behavior of buyers. The powerful buyer, however,
is not totally ignored as section 2(f) provides that "[i]t shall be un-
lawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section."' 8 2 In principle, this seems to
impose liability on large buyers that extract discriminatory price
concessions from a seller.' 83 The most likely sources of monop-
sonistic price discrimination arise in connection with unexploited
economies of scale' 8 4 and unexploited differences in supply
elasticities.
A. Monopsony and Unexploited Scale Economies
In industries with unexploited scale economies, firms possess
excess capacity. The presence of excess capacity means that some
firms could exit without increasing the costs of production. When
suppliers have excess capacity, large buyers may recognize that they
have some buying power with which to extract more favorable terms
of exchange.
In Figure 5, the seller is able to produce and sell Q, units of
output and incurs average costs per unit equal to AC. Excess ca-
pacity is signalled by the downward slope of the producer's average
cost curve (AC), which is decreasing at output Q1. Suppose a large
buyer accounts for Q, - OQ units of the total output sold. If that
buyer withdraws its business and obtains its supplies of this product
elsewhere, there will be two effects on the seller. First, it will lose
whatever profit it had been earning on that buyer's purchases. Sec-
ond, and somewhat less obviously, the seller will lose some of the
profit that it had been earning on sales to its other customers. The
seller's quantity will fall to Q and the average cost per unit will rise
to AC2. As a consequence, the total cost of serving the remaining
customers will rise by the striped area, which is equal to (AC2 -
AC)Q.
181 Section 2(a) prohibits price discrimination where its effect "may be substantially
to lessen competition." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
182 Id § 13(f).
183 Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979); Automatic Canteen Co. of
Am. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953); American Motors Specialities Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).
184 Economies of scale exist when the firm is producing on the negatively sloped
portion of its average cost curve. Expansions in output will result in reductions in per
unit costs. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 81-118 (1980) (extensive examination of this concept and its implications for mar-
ket structure).
[Vol. 76:297330
MONOPSONY
FIGURE 5
COST
AVERAGE COST
0 I a. QUANTITY
A sophisticated large buyer may engage in strategic behavior to
extract some added benefits from a seller with excess capacity. For
example, the buyer could threaten to withdraw its business unless
the seller agrees to a price equal to ACI for the buyer's purchase. 185
The seller would earn no profits on the sales to the large buyer
(Q1- Q2), but would preserve all of the profit on its sales to its
other customers (Q,). In the extreme, the large buyer could require
that the seller actually agree to a price below cost for the buyer's
purchases to the extent that losses that would be incurred on sales
to the large buyer equal the profits that would be lost on sales to
other buyers if the large buyer withdrew its business (striped area in
185 Although price discrimination is illegal if it has or is likely to have an anticom-
petitive effect, a price concession made in good faith to meet competition is legal irre-
spective of the competitive consequences. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1988) ("nothing herein
contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima fade case thus made by showing that
his lower price.., was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competi-
tor"). The Supreme Court has interpreted this defense as absolute. See Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 240-51 (1951).
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Figure 5). At that point, the seller would be indifferent between los-
ing the large buyer's account and retaining it since total profits
would be the same in both cases.
This business behavior appears abusive, but it actually tends to
bring the market to a state of equilibrium. It is economically desira-
ble that some sellers suffer losses and have to leave the industry.
Society has invested too many resources in the production of the
input. Therefore, it is socially desirable that some capacity exit the
industry. Although the large buyer's behavior may appear unsa-
vory, it increases social welfare in the long run. The antitrust laws,
as section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act suggests, do not appear
to take this view.
In practice, the large buyer may escape liability through the de-
rivative nature of the defenses the Act provides to price discriminat-
ing sellers. In particular, the buyer with monopsony power may
solicit bids from multiple sellers with excess capacity. So long as
each seller does no more than make a good faith effort to meet the
prices of competing sellers, it will have a valid "meeting competi-
tion" defense for its discriminatory offer. Because the seller would
not have engaged in unlawful price discrimination, the buyer, like-
wise, would not have violated section 2(f). 186 Most large buyers
would, therefore, escape liability for exploiting scale economies.
B. Different Supply Elasticities
The discriminating monopsonist exploits differences in supply
elasticities among inputs to pay different prices for those inputs of
identical quality.' 8 7 In Figure 6, S, and S 2 represent alternative
sources of supply of a specific input. We assume that the quality of
the input is uniform across both sources of supply.'8 8 The monop-
sonist will purchase a mix of output from the two supply sources
where both marginal factor costs are equal to the marginal revenue
product:' 8 9
186 See Automatic Canteen, 346 U.S. at 74 ("We therefore conclude that a buyer is not
liable under § 2(f) if the lower prices he induces are ... within one of the seller's
defenses .... ); see also Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co., 440 U.S. 69 (holding buyer not liable if
seller had a meeting competition defense).
187 Similarly, the discriminating monopolist exploits differences in demand elasticities
to charge different prices. See R. BLAIR & L. KENNY, supra note 39, at 268-73.
188 If the quality varies across sources of supply, the analysis is more complicated,
but the same general principles apply. See Louis PHLiPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE Dis-
CRIMINATION 203-51 (1983).
189 This condition can be derived quite simply. If production requires corn (C),
which may come from Kansas (C) or from Iowa (C2), and capital (K), which we assume
to be fixed, then profit is given by
H = P x Q(C,K) - pICI-p2C2 - rK
where P is output price, Q (C, K) is the production function, and p1, p2, and r are the
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MRP = MFC, = MFC2.
If this condition is not met, the monopsonist will change the mix.
For example, if MFC1 exceeds MFC2 , then the monopsonist will re-
duce purchases from source 1, thereby decreasing MFC1 , and re-
place those inputs with purchases from source 2, thereby increasing
MFC2. Such a rearrangement will reduce total expenditures and,
therefore, increase profits. Consequently, such shifts will continue
until the marginal factor costs are equal across all sources of supply.
FIGURE 6
PRICE AND COST
W2 . ---
01 Q2 Q" = Q1 + Q 2
ZMFC
DEMAND
QUANTITY
prices of Kansas corn, Iowa corn, and capital, respectively. Profit maximization requires
that
al -MRXMP, aC -MFC,=O
air =_MR X MP, aC -MFC 2 =0
Since aC/aCG = aC/C 2 = 1, these conditions can be written as
MRP = MFC
and
MRP = MFC 2
Combining these equations provides the expression in the text.
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In Figure 6, the horizontal summation of MFCI and MFC2 is
shown as MFC. The monopsonist will buy a total quantity of Q*.
These purchases will be split between sources 1 and 2 such that
MFCI equals MFC 2, resulting in Q1 being purchased from source 1
and Q2 being purchased from source 2. Because of the differences
in supply elasticities, the price paid to source 1 suppliers (w1)
exceeds the price paid to source 2 suppliers (w2). Because the qual-
ity of the inputs (and, therefore, their productivity) is identical
across sources of supply, we say that the price difference is
discriminatory. 190
Two consequences flow from monopsonistic price discrimina-
tion that exploits differing supply elasticities. First, because the sin-
gle price that would be paid by a nondiscriminating monopsonist
lies between w, and w2, this price discrimination expands purchases
from source 1 and contracts them from source 2.191 Second, some
producer surplus is converted to consumer surplus, which motivates
the monopsonist to discriminate in price. 192 Notwithstanding these
consequences, the practice does not affect the monopsonist's total
purchases; therefore, the total output produced by the monopsonist
remains unchanged. 193 Consequently, there is no impact upon the
monopsonist's customers.
The Robinson-Patman Act's prohibitions do not appear to ex-
tend to the discriminating monopsonist. The language of the
Robinson-Patman Act directs its prohibitions to the behavior of big
sellers-not big buyers. Perhaps "favoring" one supplier over an-
other could be viewed as an abuse of monopsony power, but we are
unaware of any cases that so hold.
190 In this context, the term "discriminatory" does not have the pejorative connota-
tion associated with our intuitive understanding of bias or prejudice. Instead, it simply
means that different prices are being paid for inputs of identical quality. See J. ROBIN-
SON, supra note 41, at 224-26.
191 If the buyer does not discriminate, it will select the quantity where the MFC in-
tersects demand. The resulting price will be between w, and w2. A price above w 2 will
induce the source 2 supply to expand while a price below w, will cause the source I
supply to shrink.
192 It can be shown that social welfare decreases on balance because output does not
expand. Such a proof depends upon a very sophisticated analysis that is related to the
welfare consequences of price discrimination by sellers. SeeJEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 137-40 (1988). The economic intuition is that the distri-
bution of purchases across rival sellers is not socially efficient.
193 A nondiscriminating monopsonist will purchase where the marginal factor cost
associated with the horizontal summation of the two supply curves (S1 and S2) intersects
demand. This marginal factor cost is precisely the X MFC in Figure 6. Thus, there will
be no change in the quantity of either input or output.
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MONOPSONY, ANTITRUST INJURY, AND ANTITRUST
STANDING
A. Background
As the preceding three Parts suggest, there are a variety of con-
texts in which monopsony can cause the types of harm the antitrust
laws are designed to prevent. Substantive economic analysis reveals
that it is an error to infer that the lower prices a monopsonist ob-
tains translate into lower ultimate prices for the monopsonist's cus-
tomers.1 94 Full incorporation of monopsony theory into antitrust
policy, however, must address the issues of antitrust injury and anti-
trust standing.1 95 Technically, antitrust injury defines the range of
harms that are compensable under the antitrust laws.' 96 Antitrust
standing limits the array of potential plaintiffs. 197 Although the is-
sues are conceptually distinct, antitrust injury is merely a subset of
antitrust standing.' 98 In other words, having suffered the right type
of injury is necessary but not sufficient to establish antitrust
standing.
1. Antitrust Injury
In the leading antitrust injury case, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 99 Pueblo, an independent operator of bowling
centers, alleged that Brunswick's acquisition of several bowling cen-
ters violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.200 Not only were the ac-
quired centers competitors of Pueblo, they were on the verge of
insolvency. Pueblo contended that.the profit it would have earned
had the competing centers left the market constituted antitrust
injury.20 1
194 See supra text accompanying notes 42-52.
195 See sources cited supra note 18; see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW $$ 334.1-342.2 (Supp. 1989) (supplement to P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 10); William H. Page, The Scope ofLiabilityforAntitrust Violations, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1445 (1985); Note, Antitrust Injury and Standing: A Question of Legal Cause, 67
MINN. L. REv. 1011 (1983); Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard,
93 YALE LJ. 1309 (1984) (authored by Daniel C. Richman); Comment, A Farewell to Arms:
The Implementation of a Policy-Based Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 72
CALIF. L. REv. 437 (1984) (authored by Clare Deffense).
196 See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, supra note 12, at 73-74; Blair & Harrison, supra note
18.
197 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 18, at 1543-52.
198 See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 539-40 (1983).
199 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
200 See supra note 140 (giving relevant portion of § 7 of Clayton Act).
201 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 481.
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The Supreme Court disagreed.20 2 The plaintiff argued that,
but for the acquisition, it would have been the sole seller in the mar-
ket, and presumably would have been able to raise prices. The
Court focused not on whether there was upward or downward pres-
sure on prices, but on whether the injury flowed from an activity the
antitrust laws were "intended to prevent." 203 Because the antitrust
laws were not intended to prevent market movement away from
concentration, Pueblo suffered no antitrust injury.
2. Antitrust Standing
The leading antitrust standing case is Associated General Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters.2°4 The case arose
from a claim by a union that a multiemployer builders' association
had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by coercing members,
nonmember landowners, and subcontractors to hire nonunion la-
bor.20 5 The Supreme Court considered a series of factors in deter-
mining that the union did not have standing.20 6 First, the Court
included an antitrust injury requirement in its approach to antitrust
standing and opined that the union had not linked its injury to the
goal of increasing competition.20 7 Second, the Court considered
not only whether the "right" type of injury had occurred, but also
the directness of the alleged injury with respect to the plaintiff.20 8
The presence of a more direct victim lessened the possibility that
the violation would go unchallenged if this particular plaintiff were
found not to have standing, and therefore weakened the argument
for standing. Finally, the AGC Court drew support from its 1977
decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,20 9 which provides that, in most
cases, only those purchasing directly from a defendant can recover
under the antitrust laws. The Illinois Brick Court reasoned that limit-
ing standing in antitrust actions for damages to direct purchasers
would avoid the twin evils of multiple liability and the complexity of
apportioning a set amount of damages among groups of plaintiffs.
Those interests also weighed against holding that the union in AGC
had antitrust standing.2 10
Against this backdrop, we consider the potential plaintiffs in the
202 Id. at 486-89.
203 Id. at 489.
204 459 U.S. 519 (1983). We refer to this case in both text and footnotes as theAGC
case.
205 Id. at 522.
206 Id. at 521.
207 Id at 538; see also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 195, 334.1 (finding a
nexus between standing and antitrust injury).
208 459 U.S. at 535, 540-43.
209 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
210 Id. at 740-41.
case of a collusive monopsony with fixed prices.21' The two obvious
groups of plaintiffs are sellers who have received lower prices be-
cause of monopsonistic pressure, and consumers who have paid
higher prices because of the monopsony's reduction in output.
B. Sellers to a Collusive Monopsony
It is tempting to conclude that sellers have suffered no antitrust
injury if their complaint is that they were unable to raise prices, be-
cause the antitrust laws are not designed to enable a seller to raise
prices.2 12  This conclusion misinterprets Brunswick. The Court
found no antitrust injury, not because the plaintiff preferred an in-
terpretation of the antitrust laws that would permit it to raise prices,
but because the activity of which the plaintiff complained had in-
creased rather than decreased competition.213 Quite the opposite is
true of sellers to a collusive monopsony. The harm suffered flows
directly from collusive activity that decreases competition among
buyers. Moreover, this injury is typically associated with decreases
in output and increases in consumer prices.
Sellers to a collusive monopsony also meet the requirements of
antitrust standing. The harm to sellers could hardly -be more direct.
They walk in the same shoes as the buyers from a price-fixing car-
tel.2 14 Moreover, a finding that sellers to a collusive monopsony
have antitrust standing does not create a risk of multiple liability.2 15
C. Customers of a Collusive Monopsony
Analysis of antitrust injury and standing for customers of a col-
lusive monopsony is less clear, and requires the suspension of one's
economic intuition. These buyers pay more even though their sup-
pliers have employed monopsony power tp obtain lower prices for
211 The analysis with respect to victims of other forms of monopsony conduct would
be similar to that which follows.
212 In Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Building, 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1018 (1984), which was not a monopsony case, Judge Posner found that the
plaintiff's inability to raise price did not constitute antitrust injury. Id. at 708-09; cf P.
AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 195, 337.2f (direct seller to a collusive monop-
sony will make a claim for the monopsony "undercharge").
213 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
214 Just as indirect buyers lacked standing in Illinois Brick, indirect sellers would also
lack standing. For example, suppose the major retail grocery chains collude and drive
down the price that they pay to meat packers for beef. The meat packers would be direct
sellers and would have standing to sue for the antitrust injury that they suffered. The
behavior of the buying cartel would also have deleterious effects on the demand for
cattle which would depress the price paid to cattle ranchers. The ranchers, however,
would be indirect sellers and lack standing despite their antitrust injury. See, e.g., Zinser
v. Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982).
215 See infra text accompanying notes 217-19.
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their inputs.216 More accurately, these buyers pay more because their
suppliers have paid less for the input. Although the economic analysis
seems thoroughly counterintuitive, the harm suffered by these con-
sumers flows from the unlawful collusion. Thus, the customers have
also suffered antitrust injury.
It is more difficult to determine whether the customers have an-
titrust standing. Although they purchase from offending firms, they
are not the parties at which the prohibited activity is directed. On
the issue of direct harm, they fall conceptually somewhere between
the indirect purchasers of Illinois Brick and the sellers to a collusive
monopsony, thereby making any conclusion premature.
For both sellers to, and customers of, a collusive monopsony,
multiple liability constitutes no stumbling block on the way to stand-
ing. In Illinois Brick, the Court assumed that a price-fixing conspir-
acy would cause harm by an amount equal to the overcharge
resulting from the conspiracy. 217 That amount was in essence a
"pie" from which each successive purchaser all the way down the
chain of distribution to the final consumer would take a "slice. '218
Under the reasoning of the Court, anything other than apportion-
ment of this fixed amount created a risk of multiple liability.2 19 Be-
cause such apportionment would be highly complex, the Court
denied standing.220 The case of a price-fixing collusive monopsony
is not analogous to the Illinois Brick defendants. The damage to the
most direct victims-the sellers-is distinct from the losses to the
purchasers. The sellers suffer a loss in revenue due to the decreased
price. Purchasers suffer from higher prices caused by restrictions in
output. Thus, there is no apportionment or multiple liability prob-
lem in the case of damages due to collusive monopsony except in
the case of indirect purchasers.
The damage calculation itself, however, would be difficult. One
would be required to determine what the price of the final output
would have been had the colluding firms paid more for the input.22 1
Although we believe that the balance tips in favor of antitrust stand-
ing for buyers from a collusive monopsony, the case for such a posi-
tion is not beyond question.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 42-52.
217 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 727.
218 Id at 740-41.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 736-38.
221 Traditionally, courts have been lenient about the degree of certainty required to
prove the amount of damages in an antitrust case. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 263-66, reh'g denied, 327 U.S. 817 (1946); see also Jeffrey L. Harrison,
The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price Enhancement Cases, 64 MINN. L. PEv. 751, 756-58
(1980) (discussing the Court's relaxation of proof requirements for the quantum of anti-
trust damages).
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SUMMARY
Antitrust policymakers and, to some extent, antitrust scholars
have never fully incorporated the symmetry of markets into their
analyses. They have focused almost exclusively on the behavior of
sellers. Yet the simple truth is that there is a buyer for every seller,
and anticompetitive conduct by buyers can cause adverse economic
consequences similar to those caused by anticompetitive conduct by
sellers. This omission from antitrust analysis posed less of a threat
when antitrust policy was governed by a few clear and well-worn per
se rules; notably, that price fixing, whether by buyers222 or sell-
ers,223 was per se unlawful.
Since the emphasis has shifted from legal rules to economic
analysis, courts and commentators must develop and explore the
economic foundations for dealing with anticompetitive conduct by
buyers. The need is pressing because the most obvious result of
concentrations of power on the buying side of a market is a decrease
in price. This tempts a court to erroneously stop its substantive
analysis at that stage, or declare that the plaintiffs have not suffered
antitrust injury.
We have examined several areas in which courts have examined
conduct by buyers. With respect to single firm and collusive abuses
of monopsony power, we conclude that the results of the bright-line
tests of the past make economic sense. We have made an effort,
however, to provide new economic underpinnings for those out-
comes. In the area of collusive monopsony, the danger that a mis-
understanding of the economics of monopsony will lead to incorrect
results reaches its apex. We emphasize three main points. First,
lower input prices resulting from the exercise of monopsony power
do not ultimately translate into lower prices to the monopsonist's
customers and increased overall consumer welfare. Thus, neither
the substantive nor the procedural analysis should stop with the ini-
tial impact on input price. Second, the monopsony model typically
employed in many economic texts and antitrust casebooks seriously
understates the variety of consequences of the exertion of monop-
sony power. Finally, the long-run consequences of monopsony
must not be ignored. Lower input prices in the short run may mean
decreases in both future supply and in ultimate, overall consumer
well-being.
We have also briefly considered merger policy and price dis-
222 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
223 See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948).
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crimination. With respect to vertical mergers by monopsonists in
which a supplier is acquired, the new antitrust wisdom that vertical
mergers are rarely harmful generally holds true. In the context of
horizontal mergers or "mergers-to-monopsony," however, the is-
sues are more complex. This complexity arises because the starting
point for merger analysis is the determination of market share. For
mergers of competing buyers, the usual analysis must be reversed,
and the "reasonable interchangeability" test for market definition
must be applied from the point of view of sellers.
In addressing price discrimination, we demonstrated that under
certain conditions a buyer with monopsony power may be able to
"coerce" a seller into discriminatory pricing. Economic analysis
suggests that any ultimate economic harm from such a practice is
unlikely. Subject to some important defenses, however, such a use
of monopsony power may violate section 2(f) of the Clayton Act.
Finally, we analyzed the issues of antitrust injury and antitrust
standing in the context of monopsony conduct. The potential plain-
tiffs in the simplest case-that of a price fixing collusive monop-
sony-include both sellers to, and buyers from, the colluding firms.
We concluded that both of these groups have suffered antitrust in-
jury. In addition, we are confident that the sellers to the collusive
monopsony have antitrust standing as well. Although we believe
that buyers from the colluding firms should have antitrust standing,
we are less confident that existing antitrust standing case law per-
mits this outcome.
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